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Growth is finally starting to accelerate as the 
global economy enters 2017. But this should 
not be seen as grounds for complacency. Both 
the Hangzhou Action Plan and the agreement 
on an Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda 
will continue to be relevant throughout 
the German presidency to ensure that 
substantive progress is made and longer-
term commitments are followed through. The 
revival of ‘animal spirits’, which some detect, 
should not diminish efforts to rebalance 
economies towards more sustainable growth 
models, but also to make further progress in 
implementing structural reforms. 
High public- and private-debt levels and continuing 
very low monetary policy rates in some countries 
weaken resilience, i.e. our ability to prevent, mitigate 
and recover from economic and financial crises.
One of the recurring themes of this conference was 
thus that policy buffers that were critical in fighting 
the global financial crisis need to be rebuilt. This is 
an essential step towards fostering resilience in the 
medium-term and thus towards preparing for future 
crises. Likewise, tailored structural reforms remain 
crucial to stimulate growth and to make our economies 
more dynamic and innovative, putting them on a 
sustainable growth path. This in turn fosters resilience 
to shocks and helps address long-term challenges. In 
sum, it is vital that more is done to enhance resilience 
in the future.
The first aim of the conference therefore was to 
highlight the issue of resilience and discuss its many 
component parts. The conference aimed to establish 
what we mean by “resilience”, how wide ranging the 
concept is, and to discuss the basis for future work to 
enhance resilience. 
The conference aimed to ensure that work during 
the German presidency is underpinned by solid 
expert advice. It sought to ensure that there is 
continuity between the work done under previous G20 
presidencies and also work done in an academic and 
research context. The results are being channelled into 
the resilience debate in ongoing G20 meetings.
This event was not part of the official G20 meetings 
programmes, and participants were invited to express 
their opinions freely. This summary thus does not 
attribute any opinion to any specific person or national 
representative.
One purpose of the conference had been to collect a 
wide variety of points of view, both in terms of economic 
approaches and in terms of geography. There are thus 
few points on which everybody agreed. Therefore, the 
outcome of this event should be sought more in terms 
of the issues that need to be addressed, than in specific 
policy recommendations.
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 Work stream 1: Public Debt 
Sustainability and transparency
 Session 1.1   Enhancing transparency through 
public sector balance sheets?
 Session 1.2  Metrics and rules for debt   
   sustainability
 Session 1.3  Sovereign debt and fiscal dominance
Work stream 2: Private Debt 
 Deleveraging and avoiding bubbles
 Session 2.1   The central bankers’ dilemma: 
Deleveraging or credit growth?
 Session 2.2   Asset price bubbles: Measurement 
and responses
 Session 2.3   How to make equity finance more 
attractive?
Work stream 3: The Real Economy 
 Resilience through flexibility
 Session 3.1  Is there an SME myth?
 Session 3.2   Which structural reforms help foster 
resilience?
 Session 3.3   Flexibility vs. (social) security: Is there 
a contradiction?
Work stream 4: Taxes 
 Improving the global framework
 Session 4.1  Domestic resource mobilisation
 Session 4.2  Investment and tax (un)certainty
 Session 4.3   Digital value added: How to tax the 
intangible? 
Work stream 5: Capital Flows 
 Shocks or shock absorbers?
 Session 5.1   Macro-prudential measures and 
capital controls: Substitutes or 
complements?
 Session 5.2   EMEs and capital flows: Is more 
better? What is more stable: bank or 
bond finance?
 Session 5.3   External effects of capital controls: 
Race to the top or the bottom?
Work stream 6:  
The Global Financial Architecture
 Session 6.1   Global financial architecture: The 
macro and the micro picture
 Session 6.2   The IMF and RFAs: Cooperation, 
integration or competition?
 Session 6.3   Global safety nets: Better incentives 
versus more money?
 We now turn to the six individual work streams.
The conference was organised around six thematic discussion groups meeting in parallel. Each of these six 
thematic groups had three separate sessions during which the more specific aspects of resilience were addressed. 
Brief statements by discussion leaders kicked off a general round of interventions in which all participants were 
able to contribute their views.
Structure of the Conference
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Sustainability and transparency
Moderator/Rapporteur: Carmen Reinhart
Session 1.1 
Enhancing transparency through public-
sector balance sheets?
Main issues: Public-sector accounts are often full of 
surprises. In a crisis, hidden liabilities tend to emerge, 
aggravating problems that were already visible 
beforehand. But even in non-stressed situations, it is 
often not clear what the public sector owns nor what 
it owes (contingent liabilities). Drawing up audited 
balance sheets for the public sector (not just central 
government) would bring clarity, not only regarding 
solvency (the net asset – liability position), but also 
regarding resilience, i.e. the capacity of the public 
sector to withstand shocks.  
Discussion leaders  
George Kopits, Ian Ball and Guangyao Zhu
Summary of discussion
Transparency is a multifaceted notion. At least four 
different dimensions of transparency were identified: 
Institutional, Accounting, Projections (risk assessment), 
Behavioural (dependability).
On the accounting side, the example of New Zealand, 
which has shifted to an accrual-based system 
stands out. This system allows for high-frequency 
monthly reporting (like in private sector), in line with 
international standards, which increases international 
comparability.  One could even argue for a more 
comprehensive balance sheet; this should not replace 
the simple view/cash flow. Too much complexity can 
lead to less transparency.
The most difficult part of national budgets, which are the 
legal foundation for spending and taxation is to predict 
the future. The forecasting record of governments but 
also international institutions is abysmal. The basis 
for forecasts should be made more transparent and 
confidence bands should be reported. The formation of 
an independent watchdog that would be responsible for 
ensuring the soundness of estimates, such as national 
fiscal councils, would be an important advantage. 
Regarding the balance sheet, additional difficulties 
arise, on both the asset and the liability side.
Assets: Here the key issue is what assets should be 
counted in the public sector balance sheet. Different 
types of assets have to be handled in different ways. 
For example some property or infrastructure might 
yield no tangible return, in contrast to financial assets 
(which, however, need to be repeatedly revaluated). 
Liabilities: this side might contain substantial “hidden 
debt”. Contingent liabilities should be included but 
remain very difficult to assess. Health care liabilities 
are probably more important but pension liabilities are 
easier to calculate, but this may be the wrong focus. 
There was also a, controversial, discussion of the 
treatment of the Central Bank as part of the public 
sector. According to some its debt should be included 
in public debt figures. But by that logic, also future 
seigniorage streams should also be included in assets. 
However, this might lead to large arbitrary shifts on 
both sides of the balance sheet.
The bottom line was that more transparency is almost 
always beneficial, but this might be difficult to achieve. 
Transparency created during good times could enhance 
resilience, but a sudden increase in transparency 
during a crisis could trigger market panic, at least 
according to some participants.
Public Debt
Work stream 1
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Session 1.2 
Metrics and rules for debt sustainability
Main issues: The analysis of debt sustainability is more 
an art than a science. The debt/GDP ratio remains the 
most widely used metric, but is it still relevant with 
interest rates close to zero? Can one really measure 
‘willingness’ to service debt? In the case of Greece, 
the IMF has switched from the debt/GDP ratio to gross 
financing needs. Should this criterion be applied more 
generally? What rules would be best to ensure the 
longer-term sustainability of public debt? 
Discussion leaders  
Clemens Fuest, Niels Thygesen and José Luis Escriva
Summary of discussion
This session was a special case since the debate 
focused largely on the euro area, but it was still felt that 
useful lessons could be drawn at the global level.
A first issue was how to choose the right metric. For 
a rule-based system, a simple metric such as the 
debt/GDP ratio and deficit/GDP appeared the most 
appropriate. But, as discussed in the first session, in 
principle one should also take assets and contingent 
liabilities into account when assessing sustainability. 
But in practice this involves too much uncertainty – 
these more encompassing metrics should be used as 
complementary information.
On the flow side, structural balances were judged 
inherently error-prone (given the difficulties in output 
gap estimation), and thus not reliable, and ex-ante 
and ex-post assessments may substantially different. 
Sustainability appeared to be enhanced at present by 
low interest rates, but there was wide agreement that 
this will not last forever and preparations needed to be 
made for higher rates, ideally by building buffers.
It was also argued that investment should be taken into 
account separately since it increases future output and 
might thus, at least, partially pay for itself. For some 
the golden rule (deficit should not exceed investment) 
should be considered (this would imply that the debt 
would not increase). 
The discussion also touched on the issue of how the 
fiscal rule in the euro area could be reformed. Some 
favoured the golden rule, others more flexibility. The 
combination of hard rules, but flexible enforcement was 
seen as counterproductive from a political point of view.
An idea considered by some in this context was that 
any new debt issuance that exceeds the ceiling allowed 
by existing deficit rules could only be financed via 
“accountability bonds” – i.e. subordinate debt which 
could be subject to a loss (haircut, interest rate reduction 
and maturity extension) if certain conditions are met that 
signal a danger to sustainability like debt above a certain 
limit.  These accountability bonds would be similar to so-
called CoCos (contingent convertible capital).
Lastly, instilling ownership of fiscal rules was seen as 
key to any successful and long-lasting fiscal framework.
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Session 1.3 
Sovereign debt and fiscal dominance
Main issues: An extensive literature emphasises 
the importance of the existence of a riskless asset 
for a well-functioning financial system. In banking 
regulation, public debt fulfils this role. But high levels 
of debt make public debt more risky. There is thus an 
inherent contradiction between the desire to increase 
the supply of riskless assets and the need to keep 
public debt safe by keeping debt ratios low. A related 
issue will arise when central banks exit from their 
unconventional policies. Will they still be able to control 
interest rates and their balance sheets when their 
actions might destabilise public debt markets? 
Discussion leaders  
Chris Sims, Guido Tabellini and Huw Pill
Summary of discussion
A first point concerned the relationships between 
monetary and fiscal policy. To many it appeared that 
monetary policy had been driven to its limits, with 
unconventional measures taken by all major central 
banks. Under these conditions only fiscal policy could 
still be expected to have a substantial impact on 
economic growth and inflation (expectations). But it 
was also emphasised that fiscal expansion needs to 
be complemented by structural reforms and the need 
for expansionary policies should diminish as countries 
return to full employment. 
The state of the euro economy was then subject to a 
controversial discussion.  Some thought that further 
fiscal expansion was needed to get inflation closer 
to the target of below, but close to 2 %.  This fiscal 
expansion might even be financed by central bank 
money creation. In this line of thought ‘helicopter 
money’ would have the additional benefit of creating 
additional safe assets. However, this approach was 
contested on several grounds. It was not clear whether 
the additional central bank money created in this way 
would be spent or saved. Additional debt issuance may 
create the expectation that there will be a tax hike in 
future (Ricardian equivalence principle).
Moreover, and this was acknowledged by most, 
this approach would create massive moral hazard 
problems. The pressure for structural reforms to 
increase productivity and enhance resilience would be 
much reduced if short-term problems were addressed 
by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.
Another controversial point concerned exit strategies 
for both monetary and fiscal policy. There was wide 
agreement that the exit might be challenging for central 
banks and therefore needs to be conducted with care, 
but it would become unavoidable sooner or later.  
The exit from fiscal policy appeared more difficult. 
Independent central banks can be relied on to exit 
when inflation returns. But the political obstacles 
are much more serious for fiscal policy. For example, 
reversing tax cuts is always politically very difficult. 
Even supposedly temporary fiscal measures tend to 
become permanent.
Moreover, an expansionary stance today reduces the 
buffers available for the next downturn. This should 
be a concern in particular for countries close to 
potential output.
Executive Summary of Proceedings
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Harvard University’s Carmen Reinhart with Nobel-prize winner Chris 
Sims, Bocconi University’s Guido Tabellini, and Goldman Sachs’ Huw Pill
Deleveraging and avoiding 
bubbles
Rapporteur: Claudio Borio
Moderator: Cinzia Alcidi
Session 2.1 
The central bankers’ dilemma: Deleveraging 
or credit growth?
Main issues: It is by now widely recognised that high 
levels of leverage threaten financial stability. But at 
the same time, many central banks try to stimulate 
credit growth because they find growth rates and 
inflation too low. But how can leverage decline without 
lower, or even negative credit growth? What can we 
learn from individual country experiences on to deal 
with non-performing loans and how to engineer a 
credit-less recovery? 
Discussion leaders  
Yung Chul Park, Isabel Schnabel and Stephen Cecchetti
Summary of discussion
Participants disagreed with the proposition that 
deleveraging and credit growth should be considered 
mutually exclusive. Deleveraging should be understood 
as recapitalising the banking system. Better capitalised 
banks would lend more and be better able to deal with 
non-performing loans. This was captured in the notion 
“healthy banks lend to healthy borrowers”. 
There was wide agreement on the need for higher 
minimum capital requirements, this raised the 
question why there is a push back against it. A 
number of arguments were put forward. First, much 
has already been done since the financial crisis. The 
banking sector feels choked to an extent that providing 
credit to the real economy becomes difficult. This 
argument was immediately countered by a participant 
pointing out the lack of empirical evidence for higher 
capital requirements leading to less lending. Second, 
as capital moves easily on global financial markets, a 
level global playing field is important.
The discussion led to a conclusion: It is managing the 
transition from being poorly capitalised to being well-
capitalised that is key. From a policy perspective, there 
is a problem: if weak banks cannot raise capital, should 
they be closed?
The wider implications of recapitalisation needed to be 
studied since higher capital implicitly forces a different 
risk/return structure on banks, which has a wider 
impact on investment decisions. 
Speedy clean-up of balance sheets could be 
supported by the authorities via the development 
of a market for bad debt and by making foreclosure 
procedures more efficient. 
Overall, a consistent and predictable policy mix is 
needed. Predictability is important because there 
is a strong negative link between policy uncertainty 
and credit growth. Being unsure about the regulatory 
environment may lead to high capital ratio, but low 
lending.  Consistency is equally important as monetary 
and fiscal policy must dovetail with prudential measures 
to facilitate deleveraging. 
Private Debt 
Work stream 2
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Session 2.2 
Asset price bubbles: Measurement and 
responses
Main issues: Since the bursting of the housing bubble in 
2007-08, it is clear that bursting asset price bubbles can 
have very high economic costs. But it remains difficult 
to identify bubbles. Does any valuation exceeding some 
historical norm deserve to be classified as a ‘bubble’, 
which will soon burst? If so, how would one judge 
present long-term interest rates (or the prices of long-
term bonds)? What is the real danger? High and rising 
asset prices, or the credit that was extended on the 
basis of high asset valuations?  
Discussion leaders  
Robert Shiller and Lewis Alexander
Summary of discussion
It was stressed first that asset price bubbles are 
complex phenomena that involve many aspects: 
Financial market theory, behavioural economics, 
sociology and neurosciences all can play a role. The 
focus was then put on narratives and how they reinforce 
bubbles. The problem is that there are often multiple 
narratives that are hard to disentangle. Regulation and 
narratives both play a role and interact. For example, 
China has a complex housing market where some rapid 
price increases have simple regulatory explanations, 
which in turn are the response to new narratives.
The political response then remains a matter of 
judgement. If narratives are key, monetary policy is not 
necessarily the right tool.
The term “bubble” is often misused. Not all asset price 
booms are bubbles (and end in crash). In the US, only 
two major crises happened in one century (1929 and 
2007). But some asset price booms can nevertheless 
be dangerous.
Important questions remain: What type of bubbles 
should we care about? There is a difference between 
credit and non-credit bubbles! 
On the measurement of bubbles (or rather the potential 
for a crisis), there was wide agreement that the single-
best indicator is credit growth (not so much the level 
of debt). Property prices booms are more dangerous 
than equity prices (the cost of an equity price bust is 
lower). This finding implies that one should reduce the 
incentives to channel funds to housing, especially when 
interest rates are low. This means that policy-makers 
should not follow the argument “we need credit to 
generate economic growth”.
Stress tests can be a useful tool to identify the potential 
for a crisis resulting from a price crash, but even the 
best stress test can only give approximate indications.
The fact that many bubbles are local rather than 
global (especially in housing) raises the issue of who 
should be responsible for their management. National 
authorities had of course the main responsibility. But 
given the integration of global financial markets, 
especially credit markets, some coordination would 
be desirable.
Executive Summary of Proceedings
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Session 2.3 
How to make equity finance more attractive?
Main issues: There is wide agreement today that equity 
finance is more stable, or rather more loss-absorbing 
and thus less subject to crises of confidence. It is 
difficult, however, to identify concrete measures that 
would have a concrete impact in terms of increasing 
the attractiveness of equity. After all, the tax advantage 
of debt should be less important in an environment of 
“low for long”. The FSB has already made proposals 
to achieve better corporate funding structures. How 
can G20 countries be spurred to take action?  
Discussion leaders  
Bruno Colmant, Vitor Gaspar and Thomas Mayer
Summary of discussion
The starting point was the observation that the most tax 
regimes discriminate against equity. Corporate income 
tax systems generally allow for the tax deduction 
of interest payments, while return to equity is not 
considered a deductible expense. At the corporate level, 
this asymmetry favours debt over equity as a means 
of funding investments. Some countries (e.g. Italy and 
Belgium) have introduced an allowance for corporate 
equity (ACE). These have brought about different 
problems and participants reflected on how they could 
be improved. Instead of an allowance as in Belgium, 
taxing equity could be made incremental as is the case 
in Italy. The details of the tax schemes to encourage 
the use of equity is thus of utmost importance to avoid 
creating new distortions, for example if small firms or 
start-ups are treated differently.  
The tax advantage of debt might not be the decisive 
reason for the limited use of equity. Another important 
reason is savers may be biased towards debt. This is 
immediately apparent where savings predominantly 
take the form of bank deposits. (Banks cannot use 
these deposits to invest in equity.) However, even when 
savings are invested in market instruments, cultural 
factors might limit the availability of equity financing if 
savers prioritise debt over equity.
People shy away from equity for three reasons: 
i) education/financial literacy; ii) there are no 
instruments that promote equity and are guaranteed 
by the government and iii) people fear volatility which 
they often confuse with losses. Exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs) are incorrectly used by many people as they are 
often sold in fire-sales in bad times.
Equity financing is particularly important for start-ups 
that typically do not have access to credit. The same 
applies to highly innovative companies more generally 
where banks have difficulties applying normal credit 
models. In these cases venture capital become key, but 
it is not always available. In Europe these funds tend 
to be small and often unable to finance firms above a 
certain size. European start-ups therefore often leave 
for the US when they grow.
Towards a more
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IMF’s Vitor Gaspar with Thomas Mayer, Flossbach von Storch 
Research Institute, Bruno Colmant, Degroof Petercam, and 
CEPS’ Cinzia Alcidi
The Real Economy
Work stream 3
Resilience through flexibility
Moderator/Rapporteur: Ngaire Woods
Session 3.1 
Is there an SME myth?
Main issues: Support for SMEs is a widely accepted 
policy goal. But research has shown that in many cases 
larger firms are more productive. In some countries, 
excessively small firm size is perceived as an obstacle 
to growth and higher productivity. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether smaller firms are more flexible given the 
limited investment they make in the general human 
capital of their employees. It is thus possible that in 
some countries the dominance of SMEs has a positive 
impact on growth and resilience, but not in others. Does 
it make sense to favour SMEs in general or should policy-
makers distinguish between SEs and MEs? Should one 
first address the regulatory barriers that impede the 
growth of small firms into becoming larger ones?    
Discussion leaders  
Andre Laboul, Helmut Kraemer-Eis and Jürgen Heraeus
Summary of discussion
Support for SMEs is, rightly, a widely accepted 
policy goal. But public policy must take into account 
that SMEs are not a homogeneous population of 
enterprises. Different categories need different policy 
actions.  One needs to distinguish between small- and 
medium-sized ones, young and old, family businesses 
or those with professional management, new business 
models and tech-driven start-ups. Furthermore, there 
are large cross-country and sectoral differences, which 
require a thorough mapping to ensure that policies 
are appropriate for the SME population of relevance. 
Many discussant thought that it might thus be useful to 
establish a taxonomy of SMEs to enable a comparison 
of policies and exchange of best practices. 
Support to SMEs can be categorised along two broad 
sub-objectives. The first is to assist SMEs in their quest 
for growth and higher productivity. Improving access 
to finance, removing regulatory barriers, facilitating 
investment, internationalisation and human capital 
accumulation and promoting sound management are 
all policies that move in this direction. 
The second is of particular relevance for resilience of the 
labour market.  Measures supporting self-employment 
and facilitating the creation of micro-enterprises can 
provide a concrete alternative to unemployment, but 
care needs to be taken to avoid subsidising unproductive 
subsistence activities.  Advanced countries are more 
likely to focus on productivity and barriers to growth, 
whereas emerging economies are more focused on 
creating employment. 
Financial constraints have often been the focus of 
policy action. Financing options for SMEs need to 
be multifaceted to match the different needs of the 
heterogeneous population of SMEs and their different 
stages of development. All kinds of instruments should 
be deployed as foreseen in the Capital Markets Union 
initiative of the European Commission, which will also 
emphasise the need to harmonise insolvency rules. The 
importance of the role of venture capital was discussed 
controversially in this context.
There was also a controversial discussion of the 
relative importance of different obstacles to SME 
growth.  Some emphasised finance, others finding 
customers and skilled workers or regulatory, political 
and economic uncertainty. An excessive regulatory 
burden could be reduced by a commitment to 
modernise outdated regulation.
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Session 3.2 
Which structural reforms help foster 
resilience?
Main issues: Structural reforms have become the 
mantra of policy-makers almost everywhere. But it 
remains very difficult to determine whether the reforms 
that have formally been adopted increase flexibility 
and make a difference in reality. The OECD has various 
indicators suggesting in general that progress has been 
made, but survey indicators show little progress on the 
ground. How do we measure flexibility (and what kind 
of flexibility matters most for resilience)? What can we 
learn from the empirical literature about the reforms 
that increase resilience and growth?
Discussion leaders  
Jacques Bughin, Bart van Ark and Rob Stewart
Summary of discussion
Rising inequality and the perception that many do 
not participate in the gains from globalisation and 
growth pose a threat to economic and political stability. 
Anti-trade, anti-immigration and anti-integration 
feelings spread more easily among those sectors 
of the population that feel excluded. This makes it 
more difficult to follow policies that foster growth and 
resilience. In countries where the focus on equality 
and the middle class has been stronger, Canada as a 
key example, populism is less of a problem. Restoring 
inclusive growth thus helps to maintain support for 
reforms and economic integration.
Structural reforms to enhance resilience will be 
necessary because digitalisation and automation 
are advancing perhaps even more quickly than in the 
past, affecting virtually every sector in ways that are 
sometimes impossible to anticipate. Technological 
chance has the potential to bring back growth, but it 
will act as a destabilising factor and recalibrate the 
balance of power among countries and sectors.
Strengthening anti-monopoly regulation and 
facilitating market exit become both more important 
with digitalisation and automation. With old business 
models rapidly becoming obsolete, market exit cannot 
be avoided, but must be carefully facilitated and 
managed from a social point of view.   
Another challenge is to maintain intergenerational 
equality in an ageing society, especially if a wide share 
of young people cannot find work. This might mean 
increasing the taxation of the older generation.
The role of investment in fostering resilience was also 
discussed, in particular in relation to investment in 
education, research, development and innovation. It was 
noted that, in national accounts, spending for education 
is not counted as an investment expenditure. Some 
thought might be given to taking spending for education 
into account when judging the macroeconomic stance 
of a country. But care needs to be taken to measure the 
productivity of this spending as well.  
Another important factor to attain a resilient economy 
is the use of sound Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs). Policies that promote activation, on-the-
job training, re-skilling towards the skills needed in 
the future are the foundations of a more resilient and 
productive workforce. 
Structural reforms are in the first instance a national 
responsibility. However, the G20 can add value, 
especially by monitoring spillovers. Structural reforms 
in one country can affect  trading partners, for example 
via enhanced competitiveness or via changes of global 
value added chains. Moreover, ALMPs can have an 
impact on migration.
Towards a more
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Session 3.3 
Flexibility vs. (social) security: Is there a 
contradiction?
Main issues: This is an age-old conundrum. For a 
long time the Scandinavian model of ‘flexicurity’, which 
combines both of these two elements, has been held up 
as a worthy approach. Is this judgement still valid today? 
What kind of flexibility will stabilise an economy and thus 
help to secure social security? More flexibility might also 
increase the short-term impact of shocks, but with the 
advantage that the adjustment to a new equilibrium is 
also faster. Is there thus a trade-off between flexibility 
and (short-term) stability?
Discussion leaders  
Enrico Giovannini, Piero Ghezzi and Alberto Alesina
Summary of discussion
This session started with a general discussion of 
the role of the G20 against the recent background 
of rising populism. The G20 should uphold the basic 
tenets of an open global economy and show how trade 
can remain an engine of growth. Growth would also 
deliver the means to ensure effective redistributive 
policies, which should in particular provide relief for 
the under-privileged. 
In the more detailed discussion, the predominant 
opinion was that there should be no contradiction or 
trade-off between social security and flexibility. The 
set of policies commonly called “flexicurity” seemed 
to be able to promote dynamism in the labour market 
without undermining social rights. It was noted that 
flexicurity should be financed with cuts in spending and 
not by increasing taxation. Furthermore, it should rely 
largely on means-tested programmes. 
More generally, it was noted that the G20 should 
promote a policy framework that does not hinge upon 
a trade-off between economic and social objectives. 
There was large consensus that the economic and 
social objectives often complement each other. Avoiding 
large inequalities and ensuring full employment can be 
seen a precondition for macroeconomic stability. 
Implementing structural reforms that introduce 
flexibility in the labour market has proved to be a 
difficult task, as there is high resistance in the society, 
even from those who would benefit the most, e.g. youth. 
One lesson learned is the need to design reforms in a 
participatory manner.    
With low wages, being employed does not prevent 
poverty or being at risk of social exclusion. Employment 
remains a key anti-poverty measure, but it needs to 
be complemented by policies that uphold the quality 
of work and wages. A human capital investment 
strategy for systemic resilience should ensure that 
high employment is compatible with high productivity 
and thus wages.  This would help to lower the risk of 
poverty. Minimum income or minimum wage schemes 
were controversially debated, with the general proviso 
that wages could not be pushed above productivity.
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Enrico Giovannini, University of Rome, Ngaire Woods, University of 
Oxford, Alberto Alesina, Harvard University, and former Peruvian 
Minister Piero Ghezzi
Improving the global framework
Rapporteur: Pascal Saint-Amans
Moderator: Karel Lannoo
Session 4.1 
Domestic resource mobilisation
Main issues: Domestic resource mobilisation remains 
a problem in many countries. The key issues are 
usually domestic, but weaknesses in domestic tax 
administration can have large cross-border spill-over 
effects. How can global cooperation prevent tax base 
erosion and profit shifting if countries differ widely in 
their capacity to implement common rules?
Discussion leaders  
Pedro Lacoste, Paul Collier and Erik Berglof
Summary of discussion
In some countries a large part of the economy 
remains untaxed (a figure of approximately 20% of 
GDP was mentioned as the global average). However, 
government support is expected from everybody. In 
some countries less than half (in an extreme example 
only about one third) of labour is engaged in the formal 
sector, while the vast majority of the population expects 
to receive a pension. This creates strong pressure on 
public finances and reduces resilience.
A minimum tax revenue is indispensable for any 
government to exist. But to mobilise resources the 
government also needs resources. Low resource 
mobilisation can thus become self-perpetuating in 
the absence of outside help. But the capacity depends 
not only on some minimum to get a tax administration 
started. The capacity to raise taxes is also highly 
correlated to other indicators of good governance, 
such as the rule of law, a working justice system, 
absence of corruption, etc. When these general 
characteristics of good governance are lacking, it 
might be difficult to effectively mobilise resources. 
The lack of taxing capacity in any one country creates 
negative spill-overs in the form of tax havens, capital 
flights, etc. 
There are examples of successful resource 
mobilisation, e.g. in Eastern Europe where the 
necessary capacity had to be built almost from 
scratch. This experience shows that capacity building 
could also be helped through close cooperation with 
more experienced tax authorities.
Taxing assets held abroad is particularly challenging 
for emerging economies. But there are solutions to 
this problem. Argentina has recently enacted a novel 
scheme of a voluntary tax declaration in order to bring 
the global assets of its residents into the open. The 
Argentinian government expects about $100 billion in 
new assets to be declared, against a 10% penalty rate 
unless the person buys 7-year, low-yield bonds from 
the government. 
A place where resource mobilisation is most needed is 
Africa, a large part of which is now confronted with a 
crisis that hit once its long boom in commodity prices 
came to an end. In order to avoid unsustainable deficits, 
many African countries will need to increase their tax 
revenues (in particular corporate income tax, which is 
quite difficult as the BEPS work has shown). To achieve 
a sustainable increase in resources, one needs to build 
and concentrate capacity. However, the expertise is 
currently fragmented across ministries; value added 
tax even creates net losses in some countries; tax 
Taxes 
Work stream 4
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officials working for their own interests instead of 
the country (capacity building to change the culture 
of corruption). Rwanda has been successful with its 
approach to reduce corruption and to foster a new kind 
of nationalism. To build trust one needs to firmly shift 
the norms that determine the parameters in which 
future governments can operate.
Session 4.2 
Investment and tax (un)certainty
Main issues: Uncertainty decidedly acts as a key 
brake on investment. The ongoing effort to close tax 
loopholes and improve the taxation of globally active 
corporations might thus have undesirable side effects. 
Can more coordination help to reduce uncertainty? 
Would it be useful to agree on some basic principles 
for tax policy to reduce the uncertainty for the private 
sector?  What principles (accountable tax policy, low 
frequency of tax law changes, simple tax codes) can 
improve tax certainty?
Discussion leaders  
David Rosenbloom and Johanna Hey
Summary of discussion
There is a general tendency for countries to emphasise 
their national sovereignty, especially in the area of 
taxation. But effective international tax cooperation 
actually supports national sovereignty in many cases by 
supporting tax income. There is thus a need for a general 
willingness on the part of countries to cooperate and agree 
to compromises. This willingness would be jeopardised if 
countries became more protectionist and nationalistic.
As a matter of fact, there is still a lot of tax competition 
among countries with similar interests, namely to 
attract foreign corporations by offering low rates. 
In these cases national tax policy reflects national 
interests, which creates prisoners dilemma (crowding 
out corporate income tax revenues). If too many 
countries take an uncooperative stance, a race to the 
bottom might ensue.
Global coordination is the key to solving international 
taxation issues (tax evasion/avoidance). But it is often 
difficult to achieve, especially in the current political 
environment. 
A key mechanism for achieving global tax coordination 
is the Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the 
OECD. It needs to be developed further because some 
emerging and developing countries are not members 
of the OECD, which might lead to multiple standards. 
Executive Summary of Proceedings
15
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble with Senator Mario Monti 
and Nobel laureate Prof Robert Shiller
The key issue for taxpayers is not only how much tax 
has to be paid (and where), but to have reasonable 
certainty on the tax bill in advance. The higher the 
uncertainty about taxes, the higher the return companies 
are likely to demand before they invest. There is thus a 
need for clear and fair/neutral procedures to settle not 
only international disputes, but also at the national level. 
More international cooperation is thus required not only to 
safeguard tax revenues, but also make the international 
tax system more predictable.
Transparency can be used to enhance tax certainty. 
Besides information sharing of taxpayer to tax 
authorities, the taxpayer should also have access to 
its tax authority and there was a very controversial 
discussion whether corporate declaration/rulings 
should be opened to the public (e.g. Apple, Google, etc.).
Most certainty-enhancing measures in the field of 
taxation target large multinationals and put SMEs in 
some cases at a disadvantage (joint audits, etc.). Thus, 
enhancing tax certainty might also contribute to fight 
such failure and in turn boost investment.
Session 4.3 
Digital value added: How to tax the 
intangible? 
Main issues: With more and more services and content 
being traded in digital form, there is a need to reflect 
more deeply on how the tax system should be revamped 
to take this trend into account.
Discussion leaders  
Sebastian Pfeiffer, Ekkehart Reimer and Michael Keen
Summary
Policy-makers need to think more broadly about 
digitalisation, since it touches on many issues in the 
economy. Digitalisation brings up issues that have 
already been difficult to manage in the past, such as 
intangible goods and two-sided markets. 
In the domain of value added tax (VAT), the main 
challenge will be to tax final consumption, which ideally 
would occur in the country where the transaction takes 
place because consumers are generally not mobile. 
But in this case the place of consumption is essentially 
where the device is connected which was used to 
access the service. 
A more difficult problem is to apply VAT for products that 
are ‘free’ (e.g. Google, Facebook or many others). There 
is no explicit price (and no monetary payment). The 
implicit price (often for a large bundle) is the personal 
data transferred. Consequentially, the questions arise 
whether this should then be considered a barter 
transaction (personal data against usage of platform) 
and should the consumer could in principle be taxed. 
In this case, one would need a model to determine the 
value of the transaction (value of leisure generated or 
of data transferred). 
In the domain of corporate income tax (CIT), a key 
issue is where the value is being created. Google 
has, for instance, local establishments everywhere in 
Europe. But it asks advertisers to sign agreements 
Towards a more
RESILIENT GLOBAL ECONOMY
16
with a subsidiary in Ireland, whereas the service 
is performed in the host country of the advertiser 
(advertising is still usually linked to language and 
national distribution chains). One could thus argue 
that the sales of advertisement should be attributed 
to the various host countries. In case companies are 
really active in the territory, without establishment, 
the allocation of the taxable income could be based 
on economic presence (e.g. sales or allocation based 
on arm-length measures). 
Another important aspect in the digital economy is 
the fact that peer-to-peer transactions in part are 
not declared, creating unfair competition with other 
businesses that are paying VAT and other taxes. 
Digitalisation could also make tax collection more 
efficient. Devices could report automatically to the 
tax authorities. Biometric identification could make 
allocation of fuel subsidies, etc. more efficient. The tax 
could become fairer, through for example averaging 
the taxable income over the entire life-time or taxing 
the total income of the shareholder instead of the 
corporate (CIT). Moreover, digitalisation is likely to 
reduce the number of cash transactions, which makes 
it more likely that income is being declared.
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Shocks or shock absorbers?
Rapporteur: He Jianxiong
Moderator: Daniel Gros
Session 5.1 
Macro-prudential measures and capital 
controls: Substitutes or complements?
Main issues: Financial crises often arise from a sudden 
stop to capital flows. One way to limit this danger is to 
restrict capital flows. Another approach would be to 
structure the financial market in such a way that the 
damage from a sudden stop is limited. Which approach 
is more promising? Is there a need to coordinate between 
the countries receiving capital inflows and those from 
which the capital originates (or is it intermediated)?
Discussion leaders  
Maurice Obstfeld and Claudia Buch
Summary of discussion
There was wide agreement that capital controls (also 
called capital-flow management measures, or CFMs) and 
macro-prudential measures (MPMs) are complements 
rather than substitutes. Both can be employed alongside 
standard macroeconomic policies, like monetary or 
exchange rate policies. The optimal mixture depends on 
the available policy space and the objectives pursued in 
individual countries and their suitability at a given time in 
the business/financial cycles.
CFMs and MPMs can overlap when large capital flows 
become a potential source of systemic risk (e.g. capital 
inflows into the domestic banking sector that can fuel 
a housing bubble – limits on the credit for real estate 
transactions).
Emerging economies have tended to use capital 
controls more often since exchange rate volatility 
was the root problem, whereas developed economies 
tended to perceive asset price volatility as the problem, 
hence a focus on MPMs.  
In practice the distinction between CFMs and MPMs 
might be less clear than in theory, especially in the 
emerging economies. In some of the largest emerging 
economies the long-standing, permanent legal and 
administrative frameworks that underpin capital 
controls are often justified as MPMs. 
Despite decades of experience with capital controls, the 
empirical literature on their effectiveness, i.e. in terms 
of influencing the volume and composition of flows, 
or avoiding exchange rate mis-alignments, remains 
‘surprisingly’ inconclusive. Care needs to be taken to 
avoid capital controls becoming ingrained, as there is 
never a good time to relax them. In the meantime, they 
could encourage rent-seeking, hamper the development 
of financial markets and prevent necessary adjustments.
More evidence is emerging on MPMs, with some studies 
analysing the impact on mitigating excessive credit 
growth (bank-level data) and the build-up of leverage. 
Going forward, it was argued that both capital controls 
and MPMs should take into account that non-bank 
financial institutions will continue to gain importance 
in financial intermediation, and also that digitalisation 
of financial services may significantly change the 
configuration of capital flows. Continued vigilance 
was thus required. The availability of data could 
be improved in terms of the timeliness, scope and 
granularity of data on capital flows. A comprehensive 
database stored at a one-stop information hub for 
MPMs should be considered.
Capital Flows 
Work stream 5
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Session 5.2 
EMEs and capital flows: Is more better? 
What is more stable: bank or bond finance?
Main issues: The role of global capital markets is in 
principle to channel the flow of capital from (capital) rich 
countries to poorer emerging economies (EMSs). But 
experience has shown that the form of these flows has 
a huge impact on financial stability. In particular, short-
term portfolio flows have often been identified as posing 
the greatest danger to financial stability. Is less better in 
this case? In the 1990s banks were in trouble because 
of their exposure to EMEs, and bond finance seemed 
more stable. This changed again after Argentina. What 
provides more resilience: bank or bond finance?
Discussion leaders  
Amar Bhattacharya, Domingo Cavallo and Gene Frieda
Summary of discussion
A first observation was that the trend in capital flows 
may no longer be mainly from advanced to emerging 
economies but from savings-rich to savings-deficit 
countries within the emerging economies. For example, 
in Latin America, investment needs are higher than 
domestic savings, hence the need for foreign capital.
 At the cyclical frequency, capital flows to emerging 
markets tend to be quite pro-cyclical and are often 
linked to turning points in monetary policy in advanced 
economies (e.g. the so-called ‘taper tantrum’ episode 
in 2013). Volatility in capital flows is thus ‘a fact of life’ 
in emerging economies. One concern is that ‘push’ 
factors will become more important than ‘pull’ factors 
in a world of diverging monetary policies. 
In response to inflow surges or disruptive outflows, 
emerging economies can resort to traditional 
instruments which should, however, be calibrated to 
the circumstances. Inflows represent an occasion to 
build up countercyclical buffers, whereas in the case 
of disruptive outflows, the exchange rate might have to 
absorb the shock. 
The form that cross-border flows take is important 
along three dimensions: the type of instrument (debt 
or equity, bond or bank finance), the maturity (short or 
long-term) and the different layers of intermediation 
(banks and non-banks). 
There was agreement that long-term, non-debt flows 
are preferable to short-term debt flows. Among debt 
instruments, bank and bond finance present both risks 
and benefits. FDI (including in the financial sector) was 
deemed as the relatively most stable component. 
Where local capital markets remain underdeveloped 
(Latin America), foreign capital flows should continue 
to be channelled via the local banking system, which 
is perhaps better equipped to evaluate the risk of 
potential borrowers. Nonetheless, it is desirable to 
bring foreign finance to the domestic market through 
local institutional investors.
A key development for the future is that the intermediation 
of capital flows is changing. Non-banks, in particular 
asset managers, are now managing larger shares of 
capital flows. Asset managers are real money investors, 
but since they must promise immediate redemption, 
they are also confronted with maturity mismatch and 
liquidity transformation issues. In addition, large waves 
of fund redemptions can have systemic implications as 
emerging markets have an important asset class due 
to the search for yield by investors. Waves into and out 
of this investment class by vehicles following market 
benchmarks could be pro-cyclical and destabilising in 
the event of a sudden loss of confidence.
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CEPS’ Karel Lannoo speaking to a participant during a break
Session 5.3 
External effects of capital controls: Race to 
the top or the bottom?
Main issues: The imposition of capital controls might 
produce external effects. If a country imposes controls 
in a crisis, financial markets might anticipate a similar 
move elsewhere, thus leading to capital flight in other 
countries and possibly even forcing these countries to 
impose controls as well. Is some coordination required 
in this area to limit systemic effects? What is the role of 
the OECD and the IMF’s codes of conduct and rules in 
this area?
Discussion leaders  
Catherine L. Mann, Robert Kahn and Rajeswari Sengupta
Summary of discussion
Decisions on capital controls are usually taken by 
the country concerned without much international 
or global coordination, as their purpose is to support 
national economic policy. However, there is a case for 
coordination as there are a number of ways in which 
external effects can emerge. For example, if there is 
regional boom, tightening of controls on inflows by 
any one recipient country can lead to more inflows and 
currency appreciation in other countries in the region 
(dubbed ‘bubble thy neighbour’).
But policies in source countries can also result in 
destabilising flows in the recipient countries. This 
has two aspects. Monetary policy in the advanced 
economies might have side effects on overall flows to 
emerging economies. Should this be taken into account 
when setting policy? Moreover, changes in controls 
on outflow by source countries could also increase 
or reduce the funding available for savings-deficient 
emerging markets. There are thus ample reasons 
to coordinate capital flow measures. The same also 
holds true for macro-prudential policies. Emerging 
economies should benefit if advanced economies 
would dampen their own cycle.
There was need for more organised/transparent 
discussion between source and recipient countries 
about their choice of policy tools and their preferred 
composition of flows (trade-off financial stability and 
growth). Different fora, the G20, the IMF and the OECD 
(with its code of conduct) all covered part of the agenda.
What could be the objective of global coordination 
on capital account measures and their liberation? 
To many, a reduction in the volatility of capital flows 
appears desirable, but some volatility over the cycles 
seems unavoidable. Increasing the resilience of the 
financial system to this volatility needs to be also part 
of the response.
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CEPS’ Daniel Gros with Rajeswari Sengupta , Indira Ghandi Institute of 
Development Research , and Robert Kahn, Council on Foreign Relations
Rapporteur / Moderator: Hélène Rey
Session 6.1 
Global financial architecture: The macro and 
the micro picture
Main issues: Ensuring the resilience of the global 
financial system requires attention to macroeconomic 
factors, such as current accounts, external debt, etc. 
But the way macroeconomic imbalances are resolved 
also depends on the structure of financial markets, in 
both creditor and debtor countries. Is one factor more 
important than the other? How can one integrate these 
two aspects?
Discussion leaders  
André Sapir and Richard Portes
Summary of discussion
The discussion started with general concerns about 
global governance in an age of populism and weak 
global economic performance. If the view that the 
global economy can be understood as a zero sum 
game gains ground, it will become more difficult to 
provide global public goods, such as a stable global 
financial architecture. 
There was thus a need to restore the broader 
legitimacy of the global framework by re-connecting 
global governance with nation states and the broader 
public. Effective global governance rests on two pillars: 
countries need to keep their own houses in order, but 
they also need to cooperate.
The importance of ‘keeping one’s own house in order’ 
was highlighted by the much stronger resilience of Latin 
America and Asia after their respective crises. In Latin 
America, a financial meltdown was (so far) avoided 
largely as a result of the reforms to their domestic 
financial systems after the 1990s. However, keeping 
one’s house in order alone is not sufficient. In a highly 
integrated world, there are important international 
spill-overs. It is thus not sufficient to prepare only 
domestically for unknown shocks. 
It was noted that there has been significant progress 
since the crisis on both macro- and micro-prudential 
policies, especially in the EU and the US, where the 
banking system has been strengthened through tighter 
regulations and better supervision. Moreover, the 
macro-prudential policy framework had been created 
to be able to identify and react to systemic threats.
Two major potential challenges for the future were 
identified: digitalisation of the economy and the advent 
of FINTECH. Too little was known about either of them. 
The G20 should position itself more at the forefront of the 
research agenda, and think more about the role of FINTECH 
and its interaction with other market participants. These 
are global phenomena, which require a global analysis.
Another issue was the growth of shadow banking. A 
large part of European bank exposure to shadow banks 
is outside the EU. This raises important regulatory issues 
that could be best addressed through a global body.
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left-to-right Nobel-prize-winner Chris Sims, Bundesbank Governor 
Jens Weidmann, People’s Bank of China He Jianxiong, German Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, Nobel-prize-winner Robert Shiller and 
Italian Senator Mario Monti
Session 6.2 
The IMF and RFAs: Cooperation, integration 
or competition?
Main issues: Regional financing arrangements (RFAs) 
might fulfil a useful role in areas where regional 
financial links are particularly strong. In the case of the 
euro area, the IMF has come in alongside the ESM. Is 
there the danger of a race to the bottom in terms of 
conditionality in the absence of coordination between 
the global and regional safety nets?
Discussion leaders  
Rakesh Mohan, Klaus Regling and Yide Qiao
Summary of discussion
A first point was that given the increasing interconnectivity 
of the global economy and financial markets, the 
consequences of even local crises tend to become more 
systemic. Given its global membership, the IMF should 
remain the central platform for cooperation. 
While there were different views expressed about the 
role of the IMF, it was agreed that increased cooperation 
as well as information and knowledge sharing with 
other regional and national institutions are needed. The 
IMF could also be a platform to facilitate more active 
cooperation and information exchange. 
Regional safety nets are required if regional financial 
linkages are particularly strong, as in the euro area, 
where the ESM has now outstanding lending which is 
several times larger than that of the IMF. Other existing 
regional arrangement have been much less active, e.g. 
the Latin American Reserve Fund and the Arabic Fund.
RFAs (regional financing arrangements) might 
generate important spill-overs, which warrant some 
degree of standardisation. One key potential problem is 
insufficient conditionality, which can lead to insufficient 
adjustment and further crisis, thus forcing the IMF to 
pick up the pieces.
The best way to limit this problem would be to harmonise/
coordinate practices across RFAs, working together 
on conditionality, including bank recapitalisation, and 
sovereign debt restructuring. 
There needs to be clarity concerning which taxpayer will 
have to pay the bill if a rescue operation does not work 
out as planned. These tensions had been visible in the 
euro area.
One obstacle for a stronger role of the IMF is the ‘stigma’ 
attached to its programmes. It is politically impossible 
for most countries in Asia to go to the IMF (20 years after 
the crisis). Reducing the issue of stigma – portraying the 
IMF not just as a bad cop but a rather as a good doctor - 
would take some communication effort.
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Carmen Reinhart, Harvard University
Session 6.3 
Global safety nets: better incentives versus 
more money?
Main issues: The global financial crisis has illustrated 
the importance of safety nets, which were strengthened 
in many parts of the world. But stronger safety nets also 
create moral hazard problems. Given the current excess 
supply of savings, the general question of liquidity versus 
insolvency arises again: Is there a need for a larger 
global safety net or stronger incentives to strengthen 
resilience at the national level?
Discussion leaders  
Dennis Snower, Samir Saran and Guillaume Chabert
Summary of discussion
There was general agreement that both regional 
and global safety nets were needed, but also that the 
incentive structure should be aligned with the amount 
of resources available. Conditionality and commitment 
to policy reform are indispensable for credible 
arrangement, but the size of the safety net should also 
be sufficient to prevent a bad equilibrium under which 
market panic could lead to an unwarranted crisis.
Given the rapid growth in the size of global financial 
markets, there was a concern that in some cases the 
IMF could lack the capacity to break the bad equilibrium. 
This led to a discussion of the potential solutions for the 
IMF to leverage up its resources to face potential future 
global challenges. One idea was for the IMF to become a 
coordinator of swap lines among central banks. Another 
idea mooted was a revolving facility with a central bank 
for short-term liquidity events. Generating more liquidity 
through SDR issuance was also mentioned. However, 
all of these solutions remained controversial. One 
key problem that remains difficult to resolve is that of 
the relative strength of the incentives to reinforce the 
resilience of the system as a whole, versus the strength 
of incentives to reinforce resilience at the national level. 
Both had to be undertaken in parallel.
Finally, it was argued by some that there were still some 
inconsistencies in parts of the patchwork of global safety 
nets. For example, only a few countries can use swap 
arrangements. Moreover, one might argue that there is 
a need for a new kind of safety net to help countries deal 
with challenges from globalisation, digitalisation and 
possibly even climate change.
Concluding Panel
The event closed with a final plenary session during 
which the rapporteurs of the different work streams 
summarised the discussion in their groups.  
Daniel Gros emphasised the need to take a systemic 
view of resilience. Action in many different policy areas 
can enable economies to withstand shocks. Lower public 
and private debt levels are a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for a resilient economy. A stronger global 
financial system is also essential to avoid the propagation 
from one country to the next. Structural reforms also 
contribute. This not only concerns reforms in labour and 
products that can make the real economy more flexible, 
but also changes in the tax system that reduce the bias 
towards debt in the financing of the corporate sector.
Ludger Schuknecht concurred that the overarching 
theme of the event had many different aspects. He 
observed that the in-depth discussion would constitute 
an important input to the work of the G20 on this issue. 
He underlined the need to take a more long-term view, 
which would also reflect confidence in the political 
institutions. The past difficult years should not be a 
reason to become pessimistic. With the improvement 
in the economic climate, there should be room for the 
emergence of a ‘virtuous cycle’ to improve resilience and 
the G20 should be in the forefront of this effort.
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